






















explores	 the	 challenges	 and	 opportunities	 in	
research	 on	 human‐induced	 security	 risks.	 After	
defining	security	as	a	good	that	has	both	public	and	
private	 characteristics,	 the	 research	 focuses	 on	
different	 elements	 within	 the	 wider	 issue.	 The	
research	 addresses	 the	 factors	 that	 influence	
agents	of	insecurity	and	the	responses	triggered	by	
i n s e c u r i t y 	t h r e a t s 	a n d 	s e c u r i t y 	p o l i c i e s . 	
Underpinned	by	research,	the	project	presents	its	
policy‐relevant	findings	with	the	goal	of	improving	














research	 project	 funded	 through	 the	 European	
Commission’s	 7th	 Framework	 Program.	 EUSECON,	 A	
New	Agenda	for	European	Security	Economics,	consists	
of	 fourteen	 partner	 institutions	 in	 nine	 different	
countries,	led	by	DIW	Berlin	–	the	German	Institute	for	
Economic	 Research.	 EUSECON	 has	 established	 an	
operational	network	of	leading	European	researchers	
to	 lay	 the	 foundations	 of	 a	 new	 European	
multidisciplinary	 research	 agenda	 in	 security	
economics	and	security	policy.	Specifically,	the	goals	of	
the	 project	 are	 to	 define	 the	 field	 of	 security	
economics,	provide	its	analytical	framework,	as	well	




and	 European	 security	 policies.	 EUSECON’s	 research	
generates	 policy	 relevant	 knowledge	 for	 the	 use	 of	
E u r o p e a n 	a n d 	i n t e r n a t i o n a l 	p o l i c y m a k e r s 	a n d 	
practitioners,	as	well	as	other	relevant	stakeholders.			
In	this	Policy	Briefing	series,	we	present	some	of	the	
most	 salient	 results	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 impact	 actual	
p o l i c y ‐ m a k i n g 	i n 	t h e 	f u t u r e . 	T h e 	c u r r e n t 	B r i e f i n g 	
o u t l i n e s 	t h e 	r e s e a r c h 	a g e n d a 	o f 	t h e 	p r o j e c t 	a n d 	






As	 Engerer	 (2011)	 points	 out,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	
definition	of	security.	One	way	to	define	security	is	by	
focusing	on	the	absence	of	risks	or	threats.	However,	
the	positive	 emotions	 associated	 with	feeling	 secure	
extend	beyond	the	simple	absence	of	external	threats.	
That	means	that	we	should	not	simply	associate	the	
p o s i t i v e 	t e r m 	o f 	s e c u r i t y 	w i t h 	t h e 	i n v e r s e 	o f 	r i s k s . 	
F u r t h e r m o r e , 	f o r 	E U S E C O N ’ s 	r e s e a r c h 	a g e n d a , 	i t 	i s 	
important	 to	 see	 how	 this	 issue	 of	 security	 can	 be	
combined	with	aspects	of	economic	research	(Engerer,	
2011).	 A	 great	 challenge	 for	 the	 accomplishment	 of	
this	goal	is	the	availability	of	data,	which	is	limited	at	
best	(Drakos,	2011).	
One	 interesting	 avenue	 of	 research	 explored	 by	
EUSECON	is	the	differentiation	between	being	secure	
and	 feeling	 secure.	 In	 this	 field,	 Drakos	 and	 Müller	
(2011)	look	the	impact	of	rare	terrorism	events	on	the	
degree	to	which	people	feel	insecure.	Although	a	single	
terrorism	 event	 should	 not	 significantly	 affect	 the	
a c t u a l 	l e v e l 	o f 	s e c u r i t y , 	i t 	t u r n s 	o u t 	t h a t 	p e r c e i v e d 	
levels	of	security	are	strongly	affected.		
F i n a l l y , 	i t 	i s 	i m p o r t a n t 	t o 	i d e n t i f y 	t h e 	s o u r c e s 	o f 	
insecurity.	One	has	to	differentiate	between	the	effects	
of	 man‐made	 insecurity,	 such	 as	 terrorism	
(Gardeazabal,	2010)	or	crime	(Schneider,	2010)	and	
natural	sources	of	insecurity,	like	earthquakes	(Brück	
a n d 	X u , 	2 0 1 1 ) . 		W h i l e 	t h e 	w o r k 	i n 	t h e 	E U S E C O N 	
project	 mostly	 deals	 with	 man‐made	 forms	 of	
insecurity,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	
definition	of	security	as	the	absence	of	risks	or	threats	
can	also	be	associated	with	natural	risks.	The	problem	
i s 	t h a t 	t h e 	p o l i c y 	p r e s c r i p t i o n s 	f o r 	t h e s e 	t y p e s 	o f 	
threats	differ	significantly.	Not	much	can	be	done	to	










f r o m 	a 	t h e o r e t i c a l 	p e r s p e c t i v e , 	b u t 	i t 	a l s o 	e n t a i l s 	





by	 private	 actors.	 In	 most	 cases,	 however,	 it	 is	
reasonable	 to	 consider	 security	 as	 a	 hybrid	 that	
displays	 aspects	 of	 both	 types	 of	 goods.	 Hence,	 the	
reduction	of	terrorism	(Bossong,	2011)	is	considered	a	





similar	 vein,	 Shortland	 and	 Vothknecht	 (2011),	
pinpoint	 the	 role	 of	 ship	 owners	 and	 insurance	
companies	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 discouraging	 maritime	
terrorism.	
F r o m 	a 	r e s e a r c h e r ’ s 	p e r s p e c t i v e 	i t 	i s 	a l s o 	
important	to	acknowledge	that	the	analysis	of	
security	 can	 also	 be	 approached	 from	
different	 directions.	 There	 is	 a	 clear	 dichotomy	
between	 security	 analyses	 from	 a	 macroeconomic	
perspective	and	those	that	take	a	microeconomic	angle.		
It	 is	 also	 worth	 exploring	 an	 alternative	 dichotomy	
that	 differentiates	 between	 the	 causes	a n d 	
consequences	 of	 insecurity.	 An	 example	 of	 the	
microeconomic	analysis	of	factors	that	 influence	the	
agent	 of	 insecurity	 is	 a	 study	 by	 Bemmelech	 et	 al.	
(2010),	 which	 uses	 suicide	 terrorism	 to	 look	 at	
microeconomic	 conditions	 that	 may	 lead	 to	 future	
terrorism.	Similarly,	Murshed	and	Pavan	(2009)	look	
at	Islamic	radicalization	in	Western	Europe.	This	can	
be	 contrasted	 with	 Schneider	 (2010),	 who	 explores	
the	role	of	financing	of	organised	crime	and	De	Groot	
et	 al.	 (2011),	 who	 take	 a	 global	 look	 at	 the	 role	 of	
governance	 in	 the	 occurrence	 of	 property	 crime.	








how	 markets	 respond	 to	 an	 act	 of	 terrorism.	






The	 EUSECON	 project	 explores	 the	 intersection	
b e t w e e n 	t h e s e 	d i c h o t o m i e s 	a n d 	h a s 	p r o d u c e d 	a 	
number	of	interesting	analyses.	
The	current	research	agenda	
The	 current	 research	 agenda,	 as	




and	 actions	 of	 individual	 terrorists	 need	 to	 be	
analysed	 in	 detail,	 but	 also	 the	 circumstances	 that	
cause	individuals	to	become	terrorists.	The	latter	may	
b e 	f r u i t f u l 	g r o u n d 	f o r 	p o l i c y 	i n 	o r d e r 	t o 	m a k e 	
terrorism	 less	 attractive	 to	 individuals.	 Such	
preventive	 measures	 can	 also	 be	 extended	 to	 what	
states	and	security	firms	do	to	ensure	that	prospective	
terrorists	 do	 not	 have	 a	 chance	 to	 exercise	 their	
threats	(Brzoska,	2011).	This	is	similar	to	what	states	
and	security	firms	can	do	to	prevent	other	forms	of	
insecurity,	 whether	 man‐made	 (terrorism,	 crime,	
piracy)	or	natural	(climate	change,	flooding).	This	is	
also	 related	 to	 a	 significant	 flaw	 in	 the	 existing	




T h e 	n e x t 	s t e p 	i n 	t h e 	f r a m e w o r k 	o f 	( i n ) s e c u r i t y 	i s 	
impact	analysis	and	the	reduction	of	this	impact.	This	
dictates	that	we	should	analyse	how	extreme	events	
a f f e c t 	i n d i v i d u a l s 	a n d 	s o c i e t y , 	b o t h 	d i r e c t l y 	a n d 	
indirectly.	At	the	same	time,	we	can	look	at	what	the	
consequences	of	particular	policy	options	are	on	the	




the	 existing	 literature.	 The	 role	 of	 media	 on	 the	




For	 example,	 whether	 or	 not	 current	 development	
p o l i c i e s 	a r e 	i n 	l i n e 	w i t h 	t h e 	s t a t e d 	o b j e c t i v e 	o f 	
increasing	 security	 should	 be	 determined.	 Another	
q u e s t i o n 	t h a t 	m u s t 	b e 	a s k e d 	i s 	w h e t h e r 	s e c u r i t y 	










i t s 	w a y 	t o 	a n s w e r i n g 	s o m e 	o f 	t h e s e 	q u e s t i o n s 	a n d 	
pointing	out	that	others	still	need	answers.	While	it	is	
n o t 	r e a l i s t i c 	t o 	t h i n k 	t h a t , 	w i t h i n 	t h e 	s c o p e 	o f 	t h i s 	
project,	all	these	questions	will	finally	be	answered,	it	







recommendations	 are	 made.	 In	 this	 Policy	 Briefing	
series,	 we	 will	 employ	 the	 available	 EUSECON	
research,	 which	 is	 peer‐reviewed	 both	 internally	
within	 the	 consortium	 and	 externally,	 to	 provide	
policymakers	with	such	recommendations.		4 | EUSECON POLICY BRIEFING 1 SEPTEMBER 2011  
 
S e c u r i t y 	p o l i c y 	w i l l 	b e n e f i t 	f r o m 	a n 	i n c r e a s e d 	
cooperation	 between	 (academic)	 researchers	 and	
practitioners	 who	 have	 first‐hand	 experience	 with	
security	data,	such	as	security	services.	In	the	United	
States,	for	example,	such	cooperation	has	proven	to	be	
v e r y 	e f f e c t i v e , 	b u t 	i t 	i s 	l e s s 	t h e 	c a s e 	i n 	E u r o p e . 	B y 	
pointing	out	such	gaps	and	suggesting	better	security	
measures,	the	EUSECON	project	is	able	to	contribute	
to	a	more	balanced	European	security	architecture.	
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four‐year	collaborative	research	project,	coordinated	by	DIW	Berlin	
and	funded	by	the	Seventh	Framework	Programme	of	the	European	
Commission.	EUSECON	analyses	the	causes,	dynamics,	and	long‐
term	effects	of	both	human‐induced	insecurity	threats	and	European	
security	policies.	
For	more	information	on	EUSECON,	please	visit	our	website:	
www.economics‐of‐security.eu/eusecon	
Or	contact	us	at:	
EUSECON	
Department	of	Development	and	Security	
German	Institute	for	Economic	Research	
Mohrenstrasse	58	
10117	Berlin,	Germany	
Tel:	+49‐30‐897889‐277	
Email:	eusecon@diw.de	
©	Olaf	J.	de	Groot	and	Myroslava	Purska	2011	
References	
Benmelech,	Efraim,	Claude	Berrebi	and	Esteban	F.	Klor	
(2010).	Economic	Conditions	and	the	Quality	of	Suicide	
Terrorism.	NBER	Working	Papers	16320.	Cambridge:	NBER.	
Bossong,	Raphael	(2011).	Public	Good	Theory	and	the	
‘Added	Value’	of	the	EU’s	Counterterrorism	Policy.		
Economics	of	Security	Working	Paper	No.	42.	Berlin:	
Economics	of	Security.	
Brück,	Tilman	and	Guo	Xu	(2011).	Who	Gives	Aid	to	Whom	
and	When?	Aid	Accelerations,	Shocks	and	Policies.	
Economics	of	Security	Working	Paper	No.	49.	Berlin:	
Economics	of	Security.	
Brzoska,	Michael	(2011).	The	Role	of	Effectiveness	and	
Efficiency	in	the	European	Union’s	Counterterrorism	Policy:	
The	Case	of	Terrorist	Financing.	Economics	of	Security	
Working	Paper	No.	51.	Berlin:	Economics	of	Security.	
Drakos,	Konstantinos	(2011).	‘Security	Economics:	A	Guide	
for	Data	Availability	and	Needs’.	Defence	and	Peace	
Economics	22(2):	147‐159.	
Drakos,	Konstantinos	and	Cathérine	Müller	(2011).	
‘Terrorism	Risk	Concern	in	Europe’.	Economics	Letters	
112(2):	195‐197.	
De	Groot,	Olaf	J.,	Matthew	D.	Rablen	and	Anja	Shortland	
(2011).	Gov‐aargh‐nance	–	“Even	Criminals	Need	Law	and	
Order”.	Economics	of	Security	Working	Paper	No.	46.	Berlin:	
Economics	of	Security.	
Engerer,	Hella	(2011).	‘Security	as	a	Public,	Private	or	Club	
Good:	Some	Fundamental	Considerations’.	Defence	and	
Peace	Economics	22(2):	135‐145.	
	
Gardeazabal,	Javier	(2010).	Vote	Shares	in	Spanish	General	
Elections	as	a	Fractional	Response	to	the	Economy	and	
Conflict.	Economics	of	Security	Working	Paper	No.	33.	Berlin:	
Economics	of	Security.	
Kollias,	Christos,	Stephanos	Papadamou	and	Apostolos	
Staggianis	(2011).	‘Terrorism	and	Capital	Markets:	The	
Effects	of	the	Madrid	and	London	Bomb	Attacks’.	
International	Review	of	Economics	&	Finance	20(4):	532‐541.	
Malečková,	Jitka	and	Dragana	Stanišić	(2011).	‘Public	Opinion	
and	Terrorist	Acts’.	European	Journal	of	Political	Economy,	
forthcoming,	doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.04.001.	
Murshed,	Syed	Mansoob	(2011).	‘Threat	Perceptions	in	
Europe:	Domestic	Terrorism	and	International	Crime’.	
Defence	and	Peace	Economics	22(2):	181‐192.	
Murshed,	Syed	Mansoob	and	Sara	Pavan	(2009).	Identity	and	
Islamic	Radicalization	in	Western	Europe.	Economics	of	
Security	Working	Paper	No.	14.	Berlin:	Economics	of	Security.	
Schneider,	Friedrich	(2010).	Money	Laundering	and	Financial	
Means	of	Organized	Crime:	Some	Preliminary	Empirical	
Results.	Economics	of	Security	Working	Paper	No.	26.	Berlin:	
Economics	of	Security.	
Shortland,	Anja	and	Marc	Vothknecht	(2011).	Combating	
“Maritime	Terrorism”	off	the	Coast	of	Somalia.	Economics	of	
Security	Working	Paper	No.	47.	Berlin:	Economics	of	Security.	
	